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NOTES AND COMMENTS
porations that cannot afford to finance stock purchase agreements in-
ternally and the life insurance companies who will lose many potential
buyers of business life insurance.
ROBERT M. HUTTAR
Torts-Privacy-Bad Debt Letters to Employer
In a Georgia case, Gouldmnan-Taber Pontiac, Inc. v. Zerbst,1 the
defendant had written the plaintiff's employer a letter in which the
plaintiff's debt was described and the employer's aid in collecting the
debt was solicited. The employer confronted the plaintiff with the
letter, asked her to explain her failure to pay, and informed her that
the letter would be kept in the permanent file on her until the defendant
sent another letter stating the debt had been paid. An action was
brought by the plaintiff for damages for invasion of her privacy, which
invasion was alleged to have caused her great mental pain and distress.
Held, an employee has a right of privacy as against his employer in the
matter of the debts he owes, and a creditor who gives such information
to the employer is liable to the employee for an invasion of his privacy.
2
Judge Townsend concurring specially in denying a motion for rehearing
stated, "The spirit and intent of Georgia law on the subject of the right
to sue in tort for an invasion of the right of privacy is sufficiently broad
to cover a case such as is made here. I do not think this rule of law
should be given lip service only. Coercive action which tends to limit the
free choice of an individual in resisting what he feels to be an unjust
claim for money upon him is reprehensible, and there have been many
times in this state where employment was so scarce that to threaten an
-employee with discharge was equivalent to threatening him with starva-
tion."3
A tort action for the invasion of the right of privacy has been
recognized in twenty states, Alaska, and the District of Columbia.
4 It
has been limited by statute in two other states5 and has been declared
199 S.E.2d 475 (Ga. 1957).
'The court referred to McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga.
App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810 (1939), wherein it was held that publication or commerciali-
zation of the information by the defendant is not necessary in order for the
plaintiff to recover for an invasion of privacy. The court also adverted to Quina v.
Roberts. 16 So. 2d 558 (La. App. 1944), wherein the defendant's letter to the
-plaintiff's employer requesting aid in collecting a debt of $1.45 was held to warrant
a recovery by the plaintiff of $100. (The Gouldinan-Taber Pontiac and theQuina cases are the two most extreme holdings protecting a debtor from an
invasion of his privacy by a creditor.) That the plaintiff claimed the alleged debt
was not owed and that the defendant had not brought suit nor gotten judgment
.gainst her was emphasized by the court in the principal case.
99 S.E.2d at 479.
'Annots., 138 A.L.R. 25 (1942), 168 A.L.R. 448 (1947), 14 A.L.R.2d 753
(1950), A.L.R. Supp. Service 771 (1957).
UTAH CoE ANN. §§ 76-4-8, 9 (1953), Donahue v. Warner Bros. Picture's
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not to exist in at least two states.0 However, the majority of these juris-
dictions hold, or at least would very likely hold, that under the facts of
the Gouldman-Taber Pontiac case there is no violation of this right.
In Voneye v. Turner,7 the court held that there was no actionable
invasion of the plaintiff's privacy, that any invasion to be actionable
must be an unwarranted one in the sense that it unreasonably and seri-
ously interferes with another's interest in keeping his affairs unknown
to the public.8 The court expressed the view that employers properly
have an interest in debts of their employees and that debtors realize that
most employers have such an interest and will approach them in regard
thereto.
In Patton v. Jacobs,9 the defendant sent to the plaintiff's employer
letters describing the plaintiff's failure to pay, and the court concluded
that since the information was given only to the employer and not to the
general public and was not accompanied by libelous or coercive matter, it
was not an unreasonable interference with the plaintiff's right of privacy.
The court decided that the employer was not in the same category as
the general public and that he has the right to know the status of the
financial obligations of his employees by virtue of his expense and in-
convenience in defending against garnishment proceedings and in mak-
ing garnishee entries on books.
Housh v. Peth °' follows the majority in holding that the defendant's
conduct to be actionable must have been unreasonable. There are cases
which hold that advertisement of the plaintiff's debt by the creditor in
his store window 11 is an invasion of privacy and that publishing the debt
in a local newspaper 12 subjects the creditor and the newspaper to lia-
bility for invasion of the right. But recovery has been denied where the
plaintiff's account was advertised by handbill as being for sale,'8 and
also where the creditor telephoned the employer.
14
Distributing Corp., 2 Utah 2d 256, 272 P.2d 177 (1954): N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW§§ 50, 51, Metzger v. Dell Publishing Co., 136 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup. Ct. 1955);
Schumann v. Loew's Incorporated, 135 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
0 Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955) ; Yoeckel
v. Samonig, 272 Wis. 430, 75 N.W.2d 925 (1956).
"240 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1951).
s See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 867 (1939).
1 118 Ind. App. 358, 78 N.E.2d 789 (1948).
1099 Ohio App. 485, 135 N.E.2d 440 (1955) (the court held that a campaign
of telephone calls to the plaintiff was an invasion of her privacy, but one call
would not have been enough).
" Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).
""Trammel v. Citizens News Co., 285 Ky. 529, 148 S.W.2d 708 (1941).
"Judevine v. Benzies-Montanye Fuel & Warehouse Co., 222 Wis. 512, 269
-N.W. 29 (1936) (the holding here may be explained by Wisconsin's refusal to
recognize the right of privacy).
1" Lewis v. Physicians & Dentists Credit Bureau, Inc., 27 Wash. 2d 267, 177
P.2d 896 (1947) (the court seems to hold that if the right of privacy exists in!
the state of Washington, it cannot be violated by oral publication).
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In Flake v. Greensboro News Co.,15 the Supreme Court of North
Carolina recognized the right of privacy. But there is no indication in
that case as to how the court would hold if confronted with facts similar
to those in the Gouldman-Taber Pontiac case.
EARmiNE L. POTEAT, JR.
Torts-Trespass to Land-Unintential and Non-Negligent
Entry as a Defense
The early English common law imposed liability for trespass upon
one whose act directly brought about an invasion of land in the posses-
sion of another. It mattered not that the invasion was intended, was the
result of reckless or negligent conduct, occurred in the course of ex-
trahazardous activity, or was a pure accident; nor did it matter that no
harm resulted. All that seems to have been required was that the actor
did the act which in fact caused the entry.-
It has been stated by eminent authority that, "The law on this sub-
ject is undergoing a process of change. Among the more important
tendencies is the limitation of liability to invasions which are intended,
or negligent, or the result of abnormally dangerous activity."'2
Smith v. Pate3 presented the North Carolina Supreme Court, for
apparently only the second time in its history, the question of whether
unintentional and non-negligent entry to land constitutes trespass. The
defendant driver's automobile crashed into the plaintiff's building; the
plaintiff sued for trespass to land, without alleging negligence; and the
defendant pleaded unavoidable accident. The trial court struck the
defense, but the supreme court held this to be error on the ground that
unavoidable accident is a valid defense if pleaded.
The first North Carolina case on the subject, Newsom v. Anderson,4
followed the early common law rule. There, the defendant, "without
design or carelessness," cut down a tree on his own land, the top of the
tree falling on plaintiff's land. Plaintiff prevailed in his subsequent suit
for trespass, the court holding that design or carelessness were not
essential ingredients of trespass.
In Smith v. Pate, the court attempted to distinguish the earlier case
-212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938) (By mistake the plaintiff's picture was
used for advertising purposes, and, in the absence of allegations and proof of special
damages, the plaintiff was allowed to recover only nominal damages. This has
been North Carolina's only case concerning the right of privacy).
'REsTATEmENT, ToRTs § 166, comment b (1934).
PaossER, TORTS § 13 (2d ed. 1955).
246 N.C. 63, 97 S.E.2d 457 (1957).
"24 N.C. 42 (1841). In Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N.C. 371 (1835), it was said
that "every unauthorized, and therefore unlawful, entry into the close of another
is a trespass." This was dictum since the question of accidental entry was not
involved.
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